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ABSTRACT 
This paper is an attempt to solve the somewhat elusive polarity item licensing 
properties of wh-questions in Swedish. As has been observed by Klima (1964) 
for English, NPIs are generally not compatible with genuinely information 
seeking wh-questions, but tend to induce rhetorical interpretations. Distin-
guishing between three types of wh-questions and the kind of information they 
request, I will systematically review the syntactic, semantic and pragmatic 
properties of each wh-type. Based on that overview, I argue that NPI-licensing 
in wh-questions is dependent on the relation between the implication of exis-
tence associated with the wh-word and the presupposition induced by the 
expressed proposition. According to my analysis, wh-words should not be 
regarded as NPI-licensing operators. Being place-holders, wh-words inherit 
whatever properties are associated with the item they replace. The licensing 
property of the wh-word is thus dependent on the licensing property of the 
referent. Thus, only wh-words referring to downward entailing expressions will 
license NPIs in their scope (e.g. when pointing to an empty set). Such wh-
questions tend to be interpreted rhetorically. 
 
1. Introduction 
The primary aim of this paper is to elucidate the negative polarity item licensing 
properties of wh-questions in Swedish. As illustrated below, NPI-licensing wh-
questions tend to be interpreted rhetorically, whereas NPI-licensing yes/no-
questions may be feliticiously used in genuinely information seeking contexts. 
The problem, of course, is how to account for this difference: 
(1) a. Vem skulle någonsin  vilja   åka till Paris?                   (rhetorical) 
      Who would        ever    want (to) go    to  Paris 
 b. #Vem åkte någonsin till Paris?   (information seeking) 
         Who went      ever        to   Paris 
                                                            
*An earlier draft of this paper was presented at the Semantics Seminar at the Centre for 
Languages and Literature, Lund University; I would like to thank the participants for an 
inspiring and helpful discussion. I am especially indebted to Christer Platzack, Valéria Molnar 
and Lars-Åke Henningsson for all their valuable comments and suggestions. I am of course 
solely responsible for all errors and shortcomings. 
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(2) a. Kommer man någonsin att   kunna lita på   banken   igen?   (rhetorical) 
         Will      you         ever     INF be-able-to   trust   bank-the  again 
b. Har du någonsin varit  i Paris?   (information seeking) 
    Have you    ever       been  to Paris 
This observation is not new; as Klima (1964) noticed, so called ‘strong’ NPIs 
(e.g. lift a finger, give a damn) induce rhetorical interpretations of questions in 
English, and are consequently not compatible with genuine information-seeking 
questions, see (3) below. Weak NPIs (e.g. any, ever), on the other hand, may be 
licensed in information-seeking contexts, as in (4). The examples in (4) are 
taken from Guerzoni & Sharvit (2007:362). 
(3) a. Who gives a damn about bankers and their lost fortunes? 
b. Who will lift a finger to legislate for the voiceless and powerless? 
(4) a. Who cooked anything? 
b. Who was ever in Paris? 
Swedish seems to differ from English in this respect, in that also weak NPIs 
induce rhetorical interpretations of wh-questions. But the generalization does not 
hold for all kinds of wh-questions; note that an NPI within the scope of varför 
(‘why’) and hur (‘how’) does not necessarily lend a rhetorical flavor to the 
question: 
(5) A: Varför skulle jag någonsin vilja    göra det? 
        Why      would   I           ever    want (to) do   that 
  B: För att det är nyttigt 
        Because  it   is  healthy 
(6) A: Hur kan jag någonsin gottgöra dig?1 
      How can     I         ever    compensate you  
  B: Köp mig en kopp   kaffe! 
         Buy  me    a   cup (of) coffee 
Admittedly, both (5) and (6) are strongly suggestive of a negative answer (e.g. 
nothing could ever make me want to do that and I could do nothing to compen-
sate you, respectively). But importantly, these questions may be answered 
informatively, e.g. by explicating the reasons for doing a certain thing or sug-
gesting how the addressee may be compensated – a fact that distinguishes (5) 
                                                            
1 Note also that this question may be paraphrased as a yes/no-question: Kan jag någonsin gottgöra dig? (‘Can I 
ever make it up to you’). 
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and (6) from (1) above. The interpretation of an NPI-licensing wh-question thus 
seems to be partly dependent on the semantic properties of the wh-word. 
 Taking this brief sketch as the outset, I will address and attempt to answer 
the following two questions in the remainder of this article: 
• What are the licensing properties of wh-questions in Swedish? 
• When and why does an NPI give rise to a rhetorical interpretation in Swe-
dish wh-questions? 
In order to answer the first question, the second question may provide a good 
starting point. In section 2, I will present a categorization of wh-questions based 
on the kind of information they request. For each clause type, I will relate its 
syntactic form to its pragmatic function and its semantic interpretation, thus get-
ting a rather fine-grained classification of wh-questions in Swedish. This section 
paves way for the analysis in section 3, in which I try to dissect the NPI-relevant 
aspects of wh-questions. In short, my proposal builds on the wh-variable: getting 
its scope from its syntactic position, it will license NPIs whenever it points to a 
downward entailing expression, e.g. an empty set. This in turn explains why 
NPIs are not compatible with information seeking contexts. A short summary in 
section 4 concludes this article. 
2. The Structural Properties of wh­questions in Swedish 
Before being able to reach any kind of generalization on the NPI-licensing prop-
erties of wh-questions, it is substantial to distinguish between the various wh-
words and the kind of information they request, especially considering the dif-
ference we noted above regarding who and why.  
 As Karttunen (1977:footnote 1) points out, the term wh-questions is in it-
self somewhat misleading; search questions would perhaps be a better term, 
“since semantically these questions involve a search for a suitable value for a 
variable”. And crucially, different search questions request fundamentally dif-
ferent kinds of information. We may distinguish at least three distinct categories 
of search questions:  
i) argument questions: vem (‘who’), vad (‘what’), vilken (‘which’) 
Questions belonging to this category request the identification of an 
unspecified syntactic argument as selected for by the verb. Syntacti-
cally, this is information belonging to the V-domain. 
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ii) framing questions: 
a) spatiotemporal questions: när (‘when’), var/vart (‘where’) 
b) circumstantial questions: hur (‘how’)  
The function of these questions is to request specification of a spatio-
temporal or circumstantial anchor to the event under discussion. Pro-
totypically, this kind of information is not part of the core proposition, 
which is syntactically reflected by the fact that they take the form of 
adverbials, adjoined to the V- or I-domain. 
iii) propositional questions: why  
This class of wh-questions requests the specification of e.g. the reasons 
for, the consequences of or the explication of the expressed proposi-
tion. This is information that lies outside the structural domains of the 
sentence, meaning that it is extra-propositional, as it were. 
Note that the categorization is based on the semantic properties of each kind, not 
the morphological correlates often associated with it. That is, the wh-word is not 
in itself important, since there may be various paraphrases filling the same func-
tion: why may be paraphrased with for what reason, but the expression still re-
quests propositional information.  
 Furthermore, there is no 1-1 mapping between the wh-word and the 
classification. For example, prototypical ‘argument’ wh-words may request the 
explication of an event rather than an argument, as in (7a). And spatiotemporal 
wh-words may request specification of an argument as selected for by the verb, 
similar to argument wh-words (7b). Finally, how may be combined with adverbs 
e.g. requesting spatiotemporal information (7c). Thus, we must keep the seman-
tic function of the question distinct from its syntactic and morphologic corre-
lates. 
(7) a. Vad ska  du göra imorgon? 
    What will you  do     tomorrow 
  b. Var står din bil? 
       where is  your car 
  c. Hur länge har  du arbetat här? 
       How  long  have you worked here 
 Following the classification above, I will in the next three subsections dis-
cuss each question type in turn, starting with argument wh-questions. 
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2.1 Argument wh­questions 
As noted above, argument wh-questions prototypically request the identification 
of an argument as selected for by the verb. As is well known, wh-questions give 
rise to an existential implicature (see e.g. Karttunen 1977), i.e. an implicature to 
the effect that the set to which the wh-word refers is non-empty. 
(8) a. Who bought that book? 
 >> someone bought that book 
 b. What did you buy? 
 >> you bought something 
That the implication of existence is pragmatic rather than semantic in nature (i.e. 
an implicature rather than a presupposition) can be proven by the fact that an 
argument wh-question can be feliticiously answered in the negative: 
(9) a. A: Vem träffade du   igår? 
          Whom   met     you yesterday 
         ‘Whom did you meet yesterday?’ 
     B: Ingen. 
            Nobody 
 b. A: Vad åt  du  till lunch  igår? 
            What ate you for   lunch yesterday 
           ‘What did you have for lunch yesterday?’ 
   B: Ingenting. 
              Nothing 
 Interestingly, there is a distinct difference in Swedish between clefted and 
non-clefted wh-questions with regards to the implications of existence they give 
rise to. A clefted argument wh-question cannot be feliticiously answered in the 
negative, as the following examples show: 
(10) a. A Vem var det som  du    åt  lunch med  igår? 
               Whom was   it that you had  lunch  with yesterday 
       B: ??Ingen / Sven 
                   Noone /  Sven 
   b. A: Vad var det (som)  du  åt  till lunch  igår? 
               What was  it    that you   ate for   lunch yesterday 
       B: ??Ingenting / Ärtsoppa och pannkakor 
                     Nothing  /     pea soup  and     pancakes 
As these two examples suggest, clefted wh-questions presuppose rather than im-
plicate existence. Put differently, we may suggest that the implication of exis-
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tence in clefted wh-questions is semantic in nature (i.e. a presupposition), whe-
reas the implication of existence in non-clefted wh-questions is pragmatic (i.e. a 
generalized conversational implicature).  
 Let me briefly outline a possible explanation to this difference between 
non-clefted and clefted argument wh-questions in Swedish. The implication of 
existence is closely linked to the truth of the proposition expressed by the ques-
tion as a whole: if I had nothing for lunch, the proposition that I had something 
for lunch is false. In other words, denying the implication of existence amounts 
to denying the implication induced by the proposition as well. The same is of 
course true if the implication of existence is affirmed: if the set to which the wh-
refers is non-empty, the proposition must be true. Trivially, if there is someone 
such that I had lunch with that someone yesterday, the proposition that I had 
lunch with someone is true. 
 For wh-questions, this logical relation between the implication of existence 
on the one hand and the truth of the proposition on the other can be reversed. 
That is, an implication to the effect that the proposition is true will inevitably 
lead to an implication of existence as well: if there is a strong implication to the 
effect that there is an event such that I met someone for lunch, there is also a 
strong implication to the effect that the wh-word must point to non-empty set. A 
trivial truth-table for argument wh-questions is listed below: 
Table 1: Truth-table for argument wh-questions 
p  q 
1 ↔ 1 
0 ↔ 0 
(Where p: presupposition of existence, and q: the proposition expressed by the wh-question) 
 In clefts, the proposition contained within the relative clause is standardly 
taken to be presupposed, as exemplified below: 
(11) Vem var det som köpte bilen? 
      Who was   it    that  bought car-the 
 >> Somebody bought the car 
From the reversible logical relations of wh-questions as exemplified above, it 
follows that the set to which the wh-word refers in (11) is non-empty: presup-
posing the proposition that somebody bought a car commits us to an existential 
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presupposition as well. Thus, clefted questions cannot be feliticiously answered 
in the negative2.  
 The truth of the proposition expressed by a non-clefted argument question, 
on the other hand, is not presupposed (although it may be pragmatically impli-
cated). Consequently, no existential presupposition will arise either. Thus, ans-
wering a non-clefted wh-question in the negative is not contradictory, as B’s 
answers in (9a) and (9b) show.  
 The kind of information clefted or non-clefted argument questions requests 
can be related to the different implications of existence each question type give 
rise to. A non-clefted argument wh-question, I would argue, requests existential 
identification of the argument denoted by the wh-word. Clefted argument wh-
questions, on the other hand, request referential specification of the argument 
denoted by the wh-word. Another way of expressing this is saying that whereas 
the arguments requested by the non-clefted wh-words in (9a) and (9b) are nei-
ther existentially presupposed nor referentially specified, the arguments 
requested by the clefted wh-words in (10a) and (10b) are referentially unspeci-
fied but existentially presupposed.  
 It should be pointed out for non-Swedish speaking readers that cleft ques-
tions are abundant in Swedish, a fact often overlooked in the literature. Cleft-
questions are preferred in any situation in which the identity, but crucially not 
the existence, is unspecified/unknown to the speaker. For example, if A wants to 
know who just called B (in a situation where A has overheard B’s talking on the 
phone), this question would be formulated as a cleft rather than a standard wh-
question, see (12a). For the same reason, if A points to an unknown person in 
the distance and wants to know who that person is, a cleft would be the natural 
choice, (12b). In both contexts, the existence of the argument denoted by the 
wh-word is non-negotiable, which is why a non-cleft (requesting existential 
identification) is less preferred3. Clefted wh-questions are thus intrinsically con-
nected to a presupposition of existence. 
(12) a. Vem var det som ringde? 
          Who was   it    that   called 
                                                            
2 Of course, the clefted sentence in (11) may be denied as well, but only by cancelling out the 
obvious presupposition: A: Vem var det som köpte bilen? (‘Who was it that bought the car’) 
B: Du måste ha fått fel för dig, bilen är ännu inte såld! (‘You have gotten it all wrong, the car 
hasn’t been sold yet!’) 
3 Note the emphasis on choice and preference. A standard wh-question may of course be used 
in any context. This follows from the discussion above: in requesting existential identification 
one also requests the referential identification (identification being a subset of existence). 
Hence, it is infeliticious to ask only for the identity of a referent if its existence is unknown, 
i.e. posing a cleft-question in a presupposition-free context. 
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 b. Vem är det som står där borta? 
           Who is    it   that     is  over  there 
 If the difference between clefted and non-clefted wh-questions can be re-
lated to the presuppositions and implicatures they give rise to, we would predict 
argument wh-questions with existential verbs to behave similarly to clefts. That 
is, the lexical properties of the verb should induce an existential presupposition 
similar to the one found in clefts. This prediction is borne out. As illustrated be-
low, existential wh-questions cannot be feliticiously denied, a fact that indicates 
that the implication of existence is presupposed rather than pragmatically impli-
cated. Note also that existential wh-questions cannot be clefted in Swedish: 
(13) a. A: Vem är det? 
                 Who is that 
       B: #Ingen / Det är Lisa 
                Nobody /   it   is  Lisa 
 b. *Vem är det som det är? 
         Who is it that it is 
(14) a. A: Vad är det? 
               what is   it 
       B: #Ingenting / Det är en avokado 
                  Nothing /       it    is   an  avocado 
 b. *Vad är det som det är? 
           What is   it    that    it   is 
 As stated in the previous section, the proposed categorization of the differ-
ent types of wh-questions is based on their semantic properties, not on the wh-
word often associated with them. Thus, a prototypical ‘argument’ wh-word can 
be used for other purposes than requesting arguments; for example, vad (‘what’) 
is often used to request an event, as in (7a) above and (15) and (16) below. Inte-
restingly though, such questions seem to behave similarly to argument ques-
tions: the non-clefted variety induces an existential implicature, whereas the 
clefted one induces a presupposition4.  
(15) A: Vad  ska du göra imorgon? 
           What will you  do   tomorrow 
         ‘What are your plans for tomorrow?’ 
                                                            
4 As Christer Platzack (p.c.) pointed out to me, there is a distinct difference also in the 
interpretation of the verb göra in the clefted and non-clefted question. Göra in clefted 
contexts seems to necessarily get main verb interpretation, as opposed to göra in non-clefts, 
which may be clearly supportive: A: Vad ska du göra i helgen? B: Bara ta det lugnt vs. A: 
Vad är det du ska göra i helgen? B: ??Bara ta det lugnt. 
 
 
91 
 
 B: Ingenting / Jag ska åka till Paris 
           Nothing    /     I   will   go to Paris 
(16) A: Vad är det (som) du ska göra imorgon? 
          What is  it       that  you will  do     tomorrow 
 B: #Ingenting / Jag ska åka till Paris 
              Nothing    /    I    will  go    to   Paris 
 
Some of these event-requesting what-questions do induce strong presupposi-
tions, and perhaps it is for this reason they show a strong reluctance for being 
clefted. Pragmatically, these kinds of questions express surprise or deviations 
from the expected: 
(17) a. A: Vad gör du här?!    (surprised) 
               What do you here 
               ‘What are you doing here 
       B: #Ingenting5 / Jag ville bara  kolla    en sak  / Jag är här på 
semester 
                    Nothing /        I wanted just (to) check something / I am here on vacation 
 b. A: ??Vad är det som du gör här?!   (surprised) 
                  What is     it    that you do here 
It is to me not clear why the question in (17) behaves as it does, but it should be 
noted that it might be roughly paraphrased by a yes/no-question (Är du här? 
(‘Are you here?’)). This may suggest that the question in (17) is not necessarily 
an information-seeking question at all. But I will leave this area unexplored for 
the time being. 
 Summarizing this section on argument wh-questions in Swedish, I suggest 
that non-clefted wh-questions prototypically request existential identification of 
a wh-word whose existence is implied via a generalized conversational impli-
cature. Clefted wh-questions, on the other hand, prototypically request referen-
tial specification of an argument whose existence is presupposed. Non-clefted 
wh-questions constructed with existential verbs behave similarly to clefts 
(although they cannot in themselves be clefted) in that they request referential 
specification. 
                                                            
5 Admittedly, this answer sounds very likely in certain contexts. But crucially, we have to 
distinguish between speaker-denial and presupposition-denial. If B answers “nothing” in a 
context where A has reason to believe that B was up to something, B’s answer will likely be 
interpreted as “I did nothing suspicious”, or something of that sort. This use of nothing is of 
course similar to saying “There’s nothing happening nowadays”, which is taken to mean 
“nothing interesting” rather than “nothing at all”. Hence, it does not deny existence as such. 
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2.2 Framing wh­questions 
Wh-questions introduced by framing wh-words come in two varieties: spatio-
temporal and circumstantial. Note first that both types seem to presuppose 
rather than (pragmatically) implicate the truth of the expressed proposition, as 
the following examples illustrate: 
(18) a. When did you move to New York? 
   >> you have moved to New York 
 b. Where did you buy that sweater? 
    >> you have bought that sweater 
 c. How can you afford your rent? 
    >> you can afford your rent 
Let us first consider spatiotemporal wh-questions. Naturally, all events must be 
spatiotemporally anchored (in some way or another), which is reflected syntacti-
cally by the presence of finiteness features. As Platzack (1998:59) remarks: 
“Without this anchoring of the time line associated with the predication, no truth 
value can be determined, hence finiteness can be said to make a proposition out 
of a predication”. From this it follows that even though the exact time and place 
of an expressed event (or state) may be underspecified in a given utterance, the 
existence of such a place and time is necessarily presupposed. In the termino-
logy introduced above, requesting spatiotemporal information thus equals 
requesting referential specification of a certain time and/or place.  
 Consequently, non-clefted spatiotemporal questions are fundamentally 
different from non-clefted argument questions: the former request referential 
specification, the latter existential identification. This difference becomes evi-
dent when we consider negative answers to spatiotemporal questions, which 
inevitably lead to the cancellation of (the truth of) the proposition. Since spatio-
temporal wh-words give rise to an existential presupposition, non-clefted spatio-
temporal questions cannot be feliticiously answered in the negative, as opposed 
to non-clefted argument questions: 
(19) A: When did John buy that book? 
  B: #Never 
(20) A: Where did John buy that book? 
  B: #Nowhere 
 Crucially, clefted spatiotemporal wh-questions have a slightly different 
function from clefted argument questions. Because of the obvious redundancy of 
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clefting a presupposed question (the reason for clefting being to make it presup-
positional), clefted spatiotemporal questions give rise to a conversational impli-
cature: the requested information has previously been activated in the discourse, 
or should be regarded as common knowledge that for some reason or another is 
unavailable to the speaker at the time of utterance (often with the speaker being 
aware of this). 
(21) A: När var det (som) Andra Världskriget  bröt  ut (nu igen)? 
          When was it     that     second    world war-the broke out now again 
  B: #Aldrig / Det vet väl alla?! / 1939 
           Never / Everybody knows that! / 1939  
(22) A: Vart var det (som) du var på semester (nu igen)? 
         Where was   it    that    you were on vacation  now again 
  B: #Ingenstans / Det har jag   sagt     tusen gånger! / Israel 
            Nowhere   /  That have  I  told (you) (a) thousand times / Israel 
The difference between clefted and non-clefted spatiotemporal questions thus 
seems to be related to information structure considerations: only spatiotemporal 
information known to the speaker to be discourse old or part of the common 
ground feliticiously licenses the clefted variety. This use should not be confused 
with requesting the referential specification of a presupposed time or place, 
since it rather requests being reminded of the referential specification.  
 Admittedly, clefted argument questions may have the exact same function, 
but often demand additional material, such as nu igen (‘now again’), or nu 
(‘now’) to get this interpretation6  
(23) A: Vem var det nu som var först på månen? 
            Who was   it now that  was   first  on moon-the 
          ‘Who was it again that first set foot on the moon?’ 
 B: Det borde du veta! / Neil Armstrong 
          That ought you know / Neil Armstrong 
(24) A: Vad var det (som) vi skulle ta med till nästa gång nu igen? 
          What was   it    that     we should   bring    for next    time now again 
 B: Har du  redan   glömt  det?! / Papper och penna 
         Have you already forgotten that /       paper and (a) pencil 
As noted in the introduction of this article, some spatiotemporal wh-words re-
quest the specification of syntactic arguments as selected for by the verb (i.e. 
information belonging to the V-domain), rather than adjoined material (belong-
                                                            
6 This addition, I believe, is highly preferred, but not necessary for this interpretation. The 
same interpretative result may be achieved with extra stress on the copula: Vem VAR det som 
var först på månen? (‘Who WAS it that first walked on the moon’). 
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ing to the I-domain). Even then, these wh-questions induce an existential pre-
supposition (probably because of the existential predicates these spatiotemporal 
wh-words are arguments to)7: 
(25) A: Var står din bil? 
          Where is your car 
 B: #Ingenstans / I garaget 
               Nowhere /   in garage-the 
 Summarizing this section, I have argued that spatiotemporal questions 
always request referential specification, rather than existential identification. 
This is because all propositions must be spatiotemporally anchored, from which 
it follows that the existence of a time and place of a given event is presupposed. 
Clefted spatiotemporal questions give rise to a conversational implicature of 
reminding the speaker of a previously made referential specification. 
2.3 Propositional wh­questions 
Although why-questions presuppose the truth of the expressed proposition, they 
can be answered in the negative without cancelling the presupposition as such, 
as in (26) below.  
(26) A: Varför köpte  du den boken? 
             Why    bought you that  book-the 
          ‘Why did you buy that book’ 
 B: Ingen anledning / Därför att den verkade intressant 
             No        reason     /     because      it      seemed interesting 
      >> you bought that book 
The possibility of wh-denial without denying the proposition distinguishes 
propositional wh-questions from framing wh-questions, which are presupposi-
tional but non-cancellable. Intuitively, this is so because all propositions must be 
spatiotemporally anchored in some way or another, but there need to be no clear 
or obvious reason for the occurrence of an event8. Hence, denying the existential 
presupposition of a propositional wh-word does not equal denying the presuppo-
sition induced by the proposition expressed by the wh-question.  
 At the same time, propositional wh-questions can be distinguished from 
argument wh-questions, which are cancellable but non-presuppositional (as (9a), 
                                                            
7 As pointed out to me by Lars-Åke Henningsson (p.c.), the existential presupposition can also 
account for the awkwardness of negative existential questions: ??Vad står inte där? (‘What is 
not there?’) and ??Vem bor inte där? (‘Who does not live there’). With emphasis on the 
negative particle, these questions improve considerably, but will have a rhetorical flavor. 
8 This claim is unrelated to the philosophical question of whether any event must have a 
reason or purpose. 
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(9b) above show). In the terminology introduced previously in this article, prop-
ositional wh-questions neither request existential identification nor referential 
specification but rather information that must be located outside the expressed 
proposition. 
 Clefted propositional questions function similarly to framing ones, how-
ever, in that they request re-activation of previously salient information. Thus, 
the reason for using clefted propositional questions seems again to be related to 
information structure considerations. As with framing cleft-questions, proposi-
tional cleft-questions cannot be feliticiously negated: 
(27) A: Varför var det (som) du åkte till Israel (nu igen)? 
             Why     was  it      that  you went  to    Israel now again 
 B: #Ingen anledning / Det har jag ju   sagt!             / För en konferens 
                 No reason         / that   have  I  PART told (you) said / for a conference  
(28) A: Hur är det (som) man säger (nu igen)? 
            How is   it      that    you    say     now again 
 B: Minns   du  inte det? / Bättre fly    än           illa fäkta 
       Remember you not    that /   better (to) run than (to) badly fence 
‘Don’t you remember?’ / ‘He who fights and run away lives to fight another day’ 
2.4 Summary 
Having discussed three different types of wh-questions and their clefted and 
non-clefted varieties, we might finally summarize the syntactic, semantic and 
pragmatic properties connected to each of them. Table 2 provides an overview 
of the properties discussed: 
Table 2: Properties of wh-questions in Swedish 
 NC-
argument 
C-
argument
NC-
frame 
C- 
frame 
NC-
prop. 
C-
prop. 
Existential 
identification 
Yes No No No No No 
Referential 
specification 
No Yes Yes Yes No No 
Re-activation 
of old info. 
No No9 No Yes No Yes 
Presupposition 
of existence 
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
             (Key: NC = non-cleft, C = cleft, Rh = rhetorical) 
                                                            
9 Except with additional material, see examples (23) and (24) above. 
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3. NPI­licensing properties of wh­questions 
Let us now return to the issue we first set out to discuss: the distribution of NPIs 
in wh-questions in Swedish. The first question that must be addressed is related 
to the property of the wh-word itself: is it an overt question operator licensing 
NPIs within its scope? Assuming an operator based approach has the obvious 
advantage of providing a generalized explanation for questions: the difference 
between yes/no-questions and wh-questions would then only be the ab-
sence/presence of a phonetically realized operator. This move appears theoreti-
cally satisfactory, but it is hardly empirically sufficient. The fact that most wh-
words will not license NPIs in information-seeking contexts severely flaws an 
operator based approach: 
(29) a. #Vem köpte någonsin boken 
            who  bought     ever      book-the 
b. #Vad ska du  ens göra idag? 
       What will you even do    today 
c. #När  vill  du  ens träffas imorgon? 
      When want you even   meet   tomorrow 
d. #Var ställde du någonsin min nya bok?  
     Where   put     you     ever        my  new  book 
Since we do not want arbitrariness in the system, the distributional facts of (29) 
are problematic: if the operator were responsible for the licensing, we would not 
expect the ungrammaticality above (i.e. the operator should not be sensitive to 
semantic or pragmatic factors). In comparison, a strong anti-veridical operator 
like negation always licenses NPIs (even though it may of course give the utter-
ance a slightly different meaning). 
 As touched upon earlier, not all wh-words behave in a similar manner; why 
and how may license NPIs without necessarily having a rhetorical flavor, as 
exemplified in (5) and (6) above, repeated here for convenience: 
 
(30) a. Varför skulle jag någonsin vilja   göra det? 
            Why     would   I          ever    want (to) do   that 
 b. Hur kan jag någonsin gottgöra  dig? 
          How can    I         ever     compensate you 
In the terminology introduced above, we might relate the licensing of polarity 
items to the function of question itself, i.e. the kind of information it requests: 
existential identification or referential specification. As mentioned several times 
already, the existential presupposition is closely linked to the presupposition 
induced by the proposition. Naturally, if the set of referents to which the wh-
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word refers is empty, the proposition is false. And vice versa: if the proposition 
is false, then the set to which the wh-word refers is empty. This reversible rela-
tion was illustrated in table 1 above for argument wh-questions. Note that dec-
larative sentences do not have the same semantic properties in this respect, since 
denying the proposition does not entail the non-existence of any of the argu-
ments (be it a subject or object)10.  
 Let us look more closely at two different questions: rhetorical questions 
and cleft-questions. If we start with the latter, it should be noted that cleft-ques-
tions do not license polarity items under any circumstances in Swedish: 
(31) a. *Vem var det som du någonsin åt lunch med? 
            Who was    it    that you     ever      had lunch with 
    b. *Vad var det som du  ens   ville    fråga mig? 
           What was   it    that you even wanted (to) ask  me 
    c. *När var det (som) du någonsin var  i Paris? 
          When was it      that   you       ever    were in Paris 
    d. *Vart var det (som) du någonsin åkte på semester? 
          Where was  it     that   you       ever      went on  vacation 
    e. *Varför var det (som) du någonsin ville      åka till Paris? 
              Why   was   it    that    you      ever   wanted (to) go   to    Paris 
    f. *Hur var det (som) man ens skulle börja göra detta? 
           How was  it     that     you even  should  start   doing  this 
This distributional fact can be related to the reversible logical relations of ques-
tions. If the truth of the proposition is presupposed, the existence of the wh-
argument is also presupposed. In other words, the wh-word points to a non-
empty set. And this, I would argue, is precisely why polarity items cannot be 
licensed in clefts. 
 The non-occurrence of NPIs in clefts may thus provide us with a solution to 
the operator based approach above. Uncontroversially, wh-words can be 
regarded as ‘dummy’-pronouns, i.e. place-holders with variable meanings. From 
that viewpoint, it follows that a wh-word in itself has very few semantic and 
syntactic properties. But it also follows that being a place-holder, it inherits 
whatever properties can be attributed to the item it replaces (i.e. its referent). 
This approach is inspired by the discussion on wh-questions in Jackendoff 
(1972:315), from which the following quote is taken11: 
                                                            
10 For example, John didn't buy the book does not equal the non-existence of John (or the 
book for that matter). 
11 Naturally, Jackendoff does not make the distinction explicated in this paper between 
existential identification and referential specification. 
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The meaning of Cwh is that the identification of a referent depends on the 
answer to the question. Wh occurs in a position closely parallel to negatives 
(who, what, where, when, which vs. nobody, nothing, nowhere, never, no and 
perhaps whether vs. not), so it is plausible that its scope is similar to that of 
negatives, i.e., all commanded material to the right in surface structure (...). 
Just as the scope of negation determines the negated part of the sentence, the 
scope of wh determines the questioned part of the sentence. 
If we assume in accordance with Jackendoff that the wh-word scopes over eve-
rything to the right of it, then we may also assume that a wh-word referring to a 
downward-entailing expression should be able to license NPIs within its scope. 
That is, when the wh-word refers to an empty or non-specific set, NPI-licensing 
becomes possible12. Whenever the wh-word refers to specific members of a set 
(i.e. upward entailing expressions), however, NPIs cannot be licensed within its 
scope. This is why an information question like Vem köpte någonsin boken? 
(‘Who bought ever the book’) is just as bad as its answer *Sven köpte någonsin 
boken (‘Sven bought ever the book’).  
 But more importantly, this is why NPI-licensing is incompatible with 
genuinely information seeking questions, as observed by Klima: only if the 
speaker already assumes the wh-word to refer to an empty set is an NPI 
licensed. For example, if it is (to the speaker’s mind at least) highly unlikely that 
there exists someone who would spend 4 years working on polarity items in 
Swedish, then it is equally unlikely that the proposition that someone would 
spend four years on polarity items in Swedish is true. And in such a context, a 
polarity item is feliticiously licensed: Who would ever spend four years working 
on NPI-licensing in Swedish?. Crucially, this is why NPI-licensing wh-questions 
tend to be interpreted rhetorically. The very function of rhetorical questions is to 
request information without expecting any, or – in our newly introduced termi-
nology – request referential specification while presupposing non-existence. 
Following this line of reasoning, it follows that NPIs do not in themselves add a 
rhetorical flavor to wh-questions. But they can only be licensed whenever the 
wh-word points to a downward entailing expression. Hence – since questions 
introduced by such wh-words tend to be interpreted rhetorically – NPI-licensing 
and rhetorical interpretations are often associated. But crucially, rhetorical inter-
pretations may be achieved independently of the presence/absence of an NPI13 – 
and NPI-licensing may take place in non-rhetorical contexts. 
                                                            
12 The same is true for personal pronouns, whose (non)specific reference is dependent on the 
item they replace. Note for example that dom (‘they’) in Swedish can only get a non-specific 
reading when licensing NPIs: Personer/dom som någonsin varit i Paris vet vad jag talar om 
(‘People/those who have ever been to Paris know what I’m talking about’). 
13 This claim can be independently corroborated by the fact that NPIs are not necessary for a 
rhetorical intpretation: VEM skulle göra något sådant? (‘WHO would do such a thing’) 
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 Based on the arguments explicated above, we might reach a quite intuitive 
understanding of why propositional wh-questions may license NPIs without be-
ing rhetorical. The reversible logical relations (i.e. between the presupposition of 
existence and the presupposition of the truth of the proposition) do not work for 
these kinds of questions. The truth table for non-clefted propositional wh-ques-
tions is presented below.  
Table 3: Truth-table for propositional wh-questions 
 
(Where p: presupposition of existence, and q: the proposition expressed by the wh-question) 
p  q 
1 → 1 
1 ← 1 
0 ← 0 
0 → 0 
As illustrated in this table, the logical relations are not reversible for proposi-
tional wh-questions. A presupposition of existence is linked to the truth of the 
presupposed proposition (i.e. if p = 1 → q = 1). That is, if there is an obvious 
reason or motivation for an event, the event must be presupposed. But crucially, 
if there is no (obvious) reason or motivation for a certain event, it does not nec-
essarily follow that there is no event taking place (i.e. if p = 0 → q = 0).  
 Moreover, presupposing the truth of the proposition does not equal presup-
posing the existence of a reason corresponding to the wh-argument either: an 
event can take place without any obvious reason or motivation (i.e. if q = 1 → p 
= 1). The existential presupposition, however, cannot arise without a true propo-
sition; if there is no event, there cannot be a reason or motivation for that event 
(i.e. if q = 0 → p = 0.)  
 NPI-licensing propositional wh-questions are thus compatible with genuine 
information seeking contexts, since the information requested is independent 
from the propositional content. That is, the wh-word may point to an empty set 
without affecting the truth of the proposition. Consequently, the wh-word 
(pointing to a downward entailing expression) may license NPIs inside a pre-
supposed proposition – which in turn explains why NPI-licensing propositional 
wh-questions may still be interpreted as requesting information. And the heavy 
but not necessary bias towards a negative answer can be attributed to the empty 
set the wh-word refers to. 
 The information requested in argument and framing wh-questions, on the 
other hand, is always closely linked to the proposition expressed, either as being 
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arguments belonging to the VP or the IP. Hence, the wh-word cannot point to an 
empty set without at the same time affecting the presupposition of the truth of 
the proposition. The truth-conditions for argument and framing wh-questions is 
given below (a repetition of table 1 above): 
Table 4: Truth-table for argument and framing wh-questions 
p  q 
1 ↔ 1 
0 ↔ 0 
(Where p: presupposition of existence, and q: the proposition expressed by the wh-question) 
According to my proposal, NPIs are licensed only when the wh-word refers to a 
downward entailing expression. The only possibility for an NPI to be licensed in 
argument and framing wh-questions thus occurs when the wh-word refers to an 
empty or non-specific set – in which case there is no presupposition of an event 
either. Consequently, the only interpretation of an NPI-licensing argument and 
framing wh-question is rhetorical, since a rhetorical question requests referential 
specification while presupposing non-existence. 
 Finally, just a few words on the importance of tense. Because of the revers-
ible logical relations of argument and framing wh-questions, the existence of an 
event equals the existence of a wh-referent and vice versa. And this explains 
why rhetorical questions are less easily accessible in the present and simple past 
tense, but very easily acceptable in the future tense and hypothetical past tense. 
Naturally, the non-existence of a wh-referent is more easily achieved with 
events belonging to the future or the hypothetical past than to the present or per-
fective past. 
 
(32) a. #När åker jag någonsin till Paris? 
          When  go     I         ever       to    Paris 
    b. #När åkte jag någonsin till Paris?¨ 
         When went   I        ever         to   Paris  
    c. När skulle jag någonsin åka till Paris? 
        When would   I        ever        go    to   Paris 
    d. När  ska jag någonsin åka till Paris? 
        When will   I         ever        go   to    Paris 
Summarizing this section, I have argued that wh-words are not inherently 
licensing operators from a syntactic point of view; this move away from syntax 
might explain the seemingly arbitrary licensing properties illustrated in (29) 
above. Rather, wh-words inherit their licensing properties from the expressions 
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they refer to. This means that syntax only determines the scope of the wh-word, 
not the licensing properties of it. But in order to defend such a claim, it is im-
portant to distinguish between the different roles of semantics and pragmatics. 
Semantic considerations are clearly important for the non NPI-licensing proper-
ties of clefts, since the presupposed status of the proposition expressed within 
the relative clause gives rise to the existential presupposition of the wh-word. 
But it seems to me that the non-existence of a referent can never be semantically 
presupposed, but rather pragmatically (or contextually) implicated. That is, NPIs 
in wh-questions are semantically blocked but pragmatically licensed. However, 
my claims need further support and looking into before any language universal 
implications can be drawn from them. 
4. Summary 
The focus of this article has been the NPI-licensing properties of wh-questions 
in Swedish. In order to pinpoint the elusive licensing properties observed in both 
Swedish and English, I divided wh-questions into three distinct categories: 
argument, framing and propositional wh-questions. The three groups behave 
distinctly different with regards to what kind of information they request and 
how the proposition expressed is semantically related to the wh-word. Argument 
wh-questions are distinct from the other two groups, in that they request exis-
tential identification: this is because non-clefted argument questions give rise to 
an existential implicature which can be cancelled by a negative answer.  
 Framing wh-questions induce an existential presupposition; thus the func-
tion of such questions is to request the referential specification of the argument 
denoted by the wh-word rather than the existential identification. Clefts, a com-
mon way of expressing questions in Swedish, are inherently presupposing envi-
ronments. But the interpretation of the cleft is also dependent on the wh-word: 
clefted argument wh-questions request referential specification, whereas clefted 
framing and propositional wh-questions have a pragmatic function of requesting 
reactivation of information. 
 From my viewpoint, wh-words are not syntactically NPI-licensing opera-
tors; rather the licensing properties of the wh-word are dependent on the proper-
ties of the referent. Since wh-words are place-holders, they inherit whatever 
properties are associated with the item they replace.  
 The information requested in argument and framing wh-questions is always 
closely linked to the proposition expressed: if the wh-word properly refers to a 
non-empty set, the proposition is by necessity true, whereas if the proposition is 
false, the wh-word must necessarily refer to an empty set. Since according to my 
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view NPIs are licensed by the properties of the wh-referent, this explains why 
NPIs are not compatible with information seeking questions: only when the wh 
emptily refers is an NPI properly licensed.  
 Propositional wh-questions do not adhere to these reversible logical rela-
tions between the existential proposition and the truth of the proposition. Hence, 
NPIs may be licensed also in information seeking contexts. This is intuitively 
understood from the fact that propositional wh-words request information inde-
pendent from the expressed proposition. 
 The view on wh-questions advocated here depends heavily on the interac-
tion between syntax, semantics and pragmatics. Such an approach, I believe, 
should be seen as advantageous rather than theoretically unsatisfactorily, since – 
in the words of Jackendoff (1972:320) – an interplay approach to language “can 
reveal generalizations that could not have been dreamed of within a purely syn-
tactic approach”. 
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